Thursday, February 15, 2007

What is Enlightenment?

Kant's answer to the question "what is enlightenment" finally brings the possibility of hope for change and escape from the status of docile bodies. In this essay, Kant defines enlightenment as "the human being's emergence from his self-incurred...inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another." This problem of minority (the label Kant assigns to this inability to use one's own independent understanding) is reminds me of the earlier discussions we had about the sexual repressive hypothesis and the incorporation of the confessional as a means of (what we thought to be) freedom. Instead of freeing us, however, this confessional only extended the methods of control and surveillance over us as we were subjected to the opinions and standards of others, then consoled for our mistakes, and given steps to approach the realm of sexual normality (this can be seen in the camps and techniques created to 'cure' homosexuals of their sexual 'deviance').

Here, Kant tells us that the only possibility for freedom is one based on individualized acceptance of "one's own worth", a concept very closely related to that of insurrection that I brought up earlier in the quarter. Saul Newman, a Professor of Philosophy at Boston college, interprets Foucault and philosopher Max Stirner, and discusses a similar idea as a method of achieving freedom. Specifically, Newman writes of Stirner's concept of 'ownness' - literally the Kantian idea of using your own reasoning/understanding without depending upon the evaluation of the surrounding society at large.

One interesting problem I encountered, however, was how to appreciate Kant's call for individuality when, in my own opinion, it directly conflicts with his notion of the Categorical Imperative, specifically the formula of universal law - i.e. that all values/maxims are moral only if they would produce beneficial results if universalized such that everyone could adopt and act upon them. It seems that Kant's discussion of enlightenment precludes this, because (as seen in his clergymen example) it would be even more impermissible for an individual, or group of individuals, to impose his/her own understanding upon another and therefore prevent the acceptance of the other's own understanding.

Interestingly enough, Newman's analysis directly incorporates this problem, as he says that the conception of ownness "is a form of freedom that goes beyond the categorical imperative. It is based on a notion of the self as a contingent and open field of possibilities, rather than on an absolute and dutiful adherence to external moral maxims." In other words, no maxim of morality would or should ever be universalized because it would subsequently infringe upon someone's own interpretation of what's moral. And, it seems that Kant agrees, for in the context of religion he says that "it is absolutely impermissible to agree, even for a single lifetime, to a permanent religious constitution not to be doubted publicly by anyone." This critique of permanent theological beliefs immune from personal interrogation can easily be applied to morality as a whole - with modern problems including civil liberties in the war on terror, torture, and the debate about homosexual marriages.

Thursday, February 8, 2007

Philosophy and Psychology

I thought the discussion of "psychological totalitarianism" was very interesting in regards to the impact of the discovery of the unconscious. Specifically I'm referring to the part of the text were Foucault says that "the old distinction of the soul and the body...no longer exists, now that we know that our body forms part of our psyche (108 of the packet)." This reminded me a lot of the reading earlier in the class about the transformation of the penal system from punishment directly on the body to punishment enacted upon the soul/psyche. As read then and reexplained here, there is actually a direct connection between the two, such that action taken upon the soul directly produces action upon the body (remember the quote about the soul as the prison of the body). That said, I think this new text goes a step further by framing the 'science' of the unconsciousness as a text that needs to be decoded. Here, however, I found the discussion of the text of the unconscious as providing its own code kind of confusing. For example, Foucault says that "one can never be sure that one has obtained the final text, that what one has obtained doesn't mean something else behind what it means (109) ." I guess given that some form of absolute determination of what the text of the unconscious means is impossible, then what's the point of trying to decode the unconscious in the first place? I suppose the point is to enable the extension of control over the domain of all the sciences as Foucault mentions, as well as for the transformation to action upon the soul (the penal system example), but why do we (the general populace) buy into this game of trying to uncover the hidden meaning of the unconscious when our efforts will forever be futile?

Now that I consider this proposition/question, however, I guess it revolves around the notion of interpretation and the subsequent manifestation of experts. Here, the expert is the person who supposedly best understands the code of the unconscious text and has a monopoly on acceptable interpretations of what the unconscious means. And, this conception of expert knowledge extends beyond the unconscious to psychology as a whole, for psychology "is always a question of what can be known about man." So then, it seems, psychology and the discovery of the unconscious extends the power/knowledge dynamic, whereby the amount of knowledge one possesses directly translates into the power s/he can exercise over others.